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Abstract 
Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. 
Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological 
individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single 
individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to 
discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists 
of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary 
isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and 
philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of 
conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related 
terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about 
biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address 
these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and 
scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is. 
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1. Introduction: The significance of the problem of biological individuality 
 
The problem of biological individuality has been central for philosophers of biology, both 
recently (Wilson 2005; Okasha 2006; Clarke 2011; Pradeu 2012; Bouchard and Huneman 
2013; Clarke 2013; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Wilson and Barker 2013) and less recently (Hull 
1978; Hull 1980; Hull 1992; Wilson 1999). It has also been widely discussed by biologists 
(e.g., Medawar 1957; Ghiselin 1974; Buss 1987; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; 
Michod 1999; Gould and Lloyd 1999; Pepper and Herron 2008; Queller and Strassmann 
2009; West and Kiers 2009; Folse and Roughgarden 2010; Minelli 2013; Herron et al. 2013; 
West et al. 2015). In general, asking what a biological individual is means asking what 
constitutes a countable, relatively well-delineated, and cohesive unit in the living world (Hull 
1992; Wilson and Barker 2013; Chauvier 2016), but of course each component of this 
definition needs to be explained and justified. 
 The exploration of the problem of biological individuality in the last two decades has 
led to several productive results. In particular, a quasi-consensus has emerged on some 
important claims. Such claims include question-dependence, rejection of anthropocentrism, 
the need for a hierarchical approach to individuality, and the idea that individuality comes in 
degrees (See Table 1).  
This consensus, incidentally, is not always acknowledged. This has sometimes led to 
the repetition of certain already well-established claims. It is no longer useful to argue that our 
conception of individuality depends on the question and scientific context under 
consideration, that the level of the organism is not the only one at which biological 
individuality can be realized, or that biological individuality is a continuous rather than a 
discrete property. The careful examination of the literature on biological individuality also 
shows that other claims – e.g., that philosophers of biology interested in biological 
individuality have tended to be ignorant of “real” biological examples – are simply misplaced, 
as illustrated by the scientifically rich contributions of those like David Hull. 
 
Label Detailed claim References 
Question-
dependence 
The answer to the question ‘what counts as a biological 
individual?’ will depend to a large extent on the scientific 
context in which the question is asked. 
(Sober 1991; Hull 1992; 
Wilson 1999; Wilson 
2005; Dupré 2012; 
Godfrey-Smith 2013) 
Anti-
anthropocentrism 
A scientifically fruitful approach to biological individuality 
should not be based on human intuition, common sense, or 
perception. It can be very unhelpful to use human beings (or 
other vertebrates) as the central model for biological 
individuals. 
(Hull 1978; Hull 1980; 
Hull 1988; Hull 1992; 
Wilson 1999) 
Hierarchization Biological individuality is nested and hierarchical; it can be 
realized at several different levels of the living world (for 
example the level of the cell and that of the organism). 
(Weismann 1893; 
Lewontin 1970; Bernard 
1974; Hull 1980; Gould 
and Lloyd 1999; Gould 
2002) 
Continuity Biological individuality comes in degrees; a biological entity 
can exemplify biological individuality to lesser and greater 
degrees. 
(Child 1915; Conklin 
1916; Sober 1991; 
Santelices 1999; Pepper 
and Herron 2008; 
Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
Transitions There have been transitions in individuality; through 
evolution, new levels of individuality have emerged as a result 
of the coming together of previously distinct entities 
(Buss 1987; Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry 
1995; Michod 1999; 
Okasha 2006; Godfrey-
Smith 2009). 
Table 1. Consensual claims for philosophers and biologists working on biological individuality. 
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 However, the consensus on some major claims should not hide the fact that there are 
many disagreements among the participants in the debate over biological individuality. In 
what follows, I will examine recent challenges to philosophical accounts about biological 
individuality and I will explain how the papers gathered in this special issue of Biology and 
Philosophy posit themselves with regard to those challenges. 
 
  
2. Recent challenges  
 
Several objections have recently been levelled at established philosophical accounts of 
biological individuality (see Box 1). First, many consider those accounts exceedingly 
monistic. Should we favour monism or pluralism when thinking about biological 
individuality? The debate has at least two aspects. The first concerns the question of 
individuality criteria. Many different, non-overlapping, individuality criteria co-exist in the 
scientific and philosophical literature (Santelices 1999; Clarke 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2013). 
These include genetic homogeneity, germ/soma separation, the possession of a developmental 
bottleneck, policing mechanisms, etc. Some philosophers are monists – either in the sense that 
they defend one particular criterion, or insofar as they try to find a fundamental and unifying 
mechanism underlying several (or even all) criteria (Clarke 2013). Other philosophers are 
pluralists, i.e., consider there must be different criteria of individuality, reflecting different 
scientific questions and contexts (Wilson 1999; Wilson 2005; Pradeu 2012; Wilson and 
Barker 2013; Godfrey-Smith 2014; Sterner 2015; Love and Brigandt 2017). The second 
aspect of the debate about monism focuses on the scientific disciplines used to establish our 
concept of a biological individual. In their reflections about biological individuality, 
philosophers of biology have tended to focus on a single biological field – generally evolution 
(Hull 1978; Hull 1980; Hull 1992; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Clarke 2013). In so 
doing, they have left aside many biological fields where the problem of biological 
individuality has also played a central role, including physiology, developmental biology, 
immunology, ecology, the cognitive sciences, among others (Dupré and O’Malley 2009; 
Pradeu 2010; Minelli 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Huneman 2014). The two aspects of the 
debate are related, at least in the sense that taking into account more biological fields is likely 
to increase the number of possible individuality criteria. 
 The second objection is that philosophers have unduly privileged a theoretical 
approach to biological individuality – at the expense of more practical and experimental 
considerations (Kovaka 2015; Chen 2016; Love and Brigandt 2017). The influence of Hull – 
and, less directly, of Quine – helps explain this situation: in several texts (e.g., Hull 1992), 
Hull explained that the only way to distance ourselves from intuition-based approaches to 
individuality was to construct a theory-based perspective (which also explains why he sees 
the heavily theoretical field of evolutionary biology as the best pathway to defining biological 
individuality). A greater attention to practices might suggest, for instance, that, in everyday 
life, biologists “individuate” entities in a flexible and pragmatic way, without any strong 
ontological commitment (Love and Brigandt 2017). Of course, it remains to be determined 
whether such pragmatically isolated entities should be considered “individuals” or not, and on 
which grounds (Chauvier 2016; Guay and Pradeu 2016a). 
 The third objection is that the majority of philosophers of biology have neglected the 
studies of the concept of biological individuality made by historians of science (Lidgard and 
Nyhart 2017). Many of the issues raised today about biological individuality have already 
been raised, in a different context, in the past. For example, the idea of nested biological 
individuality was examined by Leibniz in response to work by Swammerdam, Leeuwenhoek 
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and others (Duchesneau 2010); the concept of the multicellular organism as a society of cells 
was analysed by Claude Bernard (1974); finally, the question of part–whole relations, 
complex life cycles and alternation of generations fascinated nineteenth-century biologists 
(Nyhart and Lidgard 2011; Nyhart and Lidgard 2017). It would be fruitful and inspirational to 
examine in detail those proposals compare them with contemporary ones. It is also 
worthwhile noting that historians interested in biological individuality explore various 
biological domains1 – instead of focusing on the domain of evolutionary biology only. 
Philosophers could perhaps be inspired by this comprehensive approach to the problem of 
biological individuality. 
 The fourth objection is that these investigations into biological individuality have 
often been done in relative isolation from other domains which have produced interesting 
work on individuality (Guay and Pradeu 2016a). These domains include physics (French 
2014; French 2016), the social sciences (Paternotte 2016), and metaphysics (Dorato and 
Morganti 2011; Morganti 2013; French 2014; Chauvier 2016; Lowe 2016). Importantly, 
several individuality criteria are common to different sciences, but do not play exactly the 
same role in each science. It could, thus, be useful to compare these different situations to 
build a better-informed conception of individuality in biology and philosophy of biology.  
Metaphysics can also be helpful. It is well known that individuality has been a central 
question in metaphysics for several centuries (Strawson 1959; Chauvier 2016; Lowe 2016). 
Metaphysicians have produced precise analyses of individuality and cognate concepts or 
views – for instance identity, persistence, four-dimensionalism, sortalism, among many 
others. These contributions could certainly help philosophers of biology produce a more 
precise conception of a biological individual (Guay and Pradeu 2016b; Haber 2016). From 
this point of view, recent innovative work at the interface of philosophy of biology and 
metaphysics might call attention to several benefits philosophers of biology could get from a 
stronger attention to metaphysical considerations (Ferner 2016; Wiggins 2016a; Wiggins 
2016b). 
The fifth objection concerns conceptual uncertainties. There is considerable confusion 
over the definition of the notion of a “biological individual”, and of related terms such as 
“organism”, “whole” and “parts”, “unity”, “cohesion”, among others (Santelices 1999; Clarke 
2011). In the philosophy of biology literature, we find very few attempts to offer precise 
definitions of those terms, even though they constitute the backbone of the debate over what a 
biological individual is.  
 
 
Objection 1: Monism  Tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a 
single biological field (generally evolution). 
Objection 2: Theory-centrism Tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation. 
Objection 3: Ahistoricity Tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of 
biology have said about biological individuality.  
Objection 4: Disciplinary isolationism Tendency to isolate biology from other scientific and philosophical 
domains that have investigated individuality, including physics, 
the social sciences, or metaphysics. 
Objection 5: Conceptual uncertainties Lack of definition of “biological individual” and related terms. 
Box 1. Recent objections to philosophical accounts of biological individuality 
 
 
To these five objections, we can add another, more traditional, one. It asks: To which 
biological entities can the notion of biological individuality be applied? A concept of 
																																																						
1	These	include	morphology	(Nyhart	1995),	developmental	biology	(Benson	1981;	Maienschein	2011)	and	cell	
biology	(Duchesneau	1987;	Canguilhem	1992;	Gayon	1998;	Bechtel	2006),	among	other	fields.	
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biological individuality that would be applicable to only a small fraction of the living world – 
for instance to animals only – would not be satisfying from a biological point of view (unless 
of course we have strong biological reasons to make such a distinction). As stated, the need to 
avoid biases towards vertebrates or even metazoans was emphasized in early philosophical 
discussions about biological individuality (Hull 1978; Hull 1992; Wilson 1999). But 
philosophers of biology have recently begun discussing certain neglected cases, some of 
which might prove challenging for traditional criteria of individuality. This includes studies of 
fungi (Booth 2014a; Molter 2016), stem cells as compared to non-stem cells (Fagan 2016), 
living things with highly complex life cycles including some plants (Godfrey-Smith 2016; 
Griesemer 2016) and some eukaryotic microbes (O’Malley 2016), and even perhaps viruses 
(Forterre 2016). 
The challenges above are examined at length in several recent publications. The move 
from theory-centrism (Objection #2) to a stronger attention to practices and experimental 
contexts is made in many parts of current philosophy of science (e.g., Waters 2008; Ankeny 
et al. 2011; Love 2015), and this move is gaining prominence in the debate about biological 
individuality (Chen 2016; Fagan 2016; Love and Brigandt 2017). The combination of 
historical and philosophical approaches (in response to Objection #3) is the main topic of a 
forthcoming volume edited by Scott Lidgard and Lynn Nyhart (Lidgard and Nyhart 2017). 
Based on an analysis of past and present-day examples, Lidgard and Nyhart propose to divide 
the problem of biological individuality into four sub-problems: individuation (thresholds, 
boundaries, inside/outside, autonomy); hierarchy (levels of organization in complex systems); 
horizontality (interactions among parts in making a whole); and temporality (change through 
time, particularly in part-whole relations). These four categories are useful to locate and 
compare many contemporary positions within the debate over biological individuality. In 
parallel, there is an on-going attempt to collate biology with other domains (which constitutes 
a response to Objection #4), particularly physics and metaphysics (French 2011; French 2014; 
Ferner 2016; French 2016; Guay and Pradeu 2016b; Mygal et al. 2016). 
This special issue of Biology and Philosophy mainly addresses Objections #1 and #5. 
The next section explains how the contributions gathered here can be seen as replies to these 
objections. 
 
3. Attempts to build a more diversified and more precise conception of biological 
individuality 
 
Many of the papers gathered in this special issue are interested in the monism–pluralism 
debate. Should we adopt several individuality criteria, or should we favour one criterion – and 
if so which one and with which arguments? Should we ground our concept of individuality in 
several biological domains or in one given domain – and, here again, if we opt for the 
monistic choice, on what basis should we do so? 
 Philosophical debates about biological individuality have focused almost exclusively 
on an evolutionary approach (Hull 1978; Hull 1980; Hull 1992; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 
2009; Clarke 2013). One organising thought that informs this special issue is that a major aim 
for philosophers of biology should be to account for the numerous biological fields that 
explore the question of biological individuality. Indeed, the incorporation, confrontation, and 
combination of different biological perspectives probably constitutes the most generative way 
of building a unified and biologically informed conception of biological individuality (see 
Figure 1).  
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Fig. 1. The concept of a biological individual will be enriched by a confrontation and combination of the 
perspectives offered by different biological domains. Only six domains are mentioned here, but many others 
can contribute to debates about biological individuality. 
 
 Three papers of this special issue explore the field of immunology, in which the notion 
of individuality has been intensively explored in the last decades (Loeb 1930; Loeb 1945; 
Medawar 1957; Burnet 1960; Tauber 1991; Pradeu 2012). Lynn Chiu and Gérard Eberl (a 
world-leading scientist in the field of gut immunology) examine host-microbe associations in 
light of the recently proposed “equilibrium model of immunity” (Eberl 2016). Scott Gilbert 
and Alfred Tauber suggest that recent work on symbiosis and so-called “holobionts” 
(conceived as functionally integrated and cohesive units constituted of a host and the 
microbes that live within and on it) casts doubt on traditional views on biological 
individuality, and could potentially re-orient the whole field of immunology. Thomas Pradeu 
uses immunology to offer a refined conception of the delineation and persistence of 
physiological individuals, based on the argument that the immune system constitutes, in any 
living thing, a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion.  
Peter Godfrey-Smith examines the relation between biological individuality and the 
cognitive sciences, in light of work on “minimal cognition” and the emergence of early 
nervous systems (Keijzer et al. 2013). Developmental biology plays a central role in the 
contribution of Gilbert and Tauber, who have long argued for a coming together of the study 
of development and immunology (Tauber 1991; Gilbert 2002). Furthermore, Pradeu shows 
that, over more than two centuries, physiology has produced very important analyses of 
biological individuality, which should be combined with evolution-based approaches. 
Finally, several contributors pay attention to what the field of ecology has to say about 
biological individuality, including David Queller and Joan Strassmann, Derek Skillings, and, 
in an “ecological-developmental” perspective, Gilbert and Tauber as well as Chiu and Eberl. 
In addition to all these biological domains, the contributors of this special issue 
explore, at length, studies on symbiosis. These studies do not constitute a “biological domain” 
as such; instead, they are located at the interface of many disciplines, including microbiology, 
evolutionary biology, ecology, developmental biology, immunology, among several others 
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(McFall-Ngai 2008; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013). Symbiosis studies have flourished in the last 
ten years, and they have offered key insights for anyone interested in biological individuality. 
The fact that virtually every living thing is home to “foreign passengers” – some of which 
play important functional roles in the host – raises important issues regarding biological 
boundaries, individuality criteria based on genetic homogeneity, etc. (Gilbert 2002; Bosch 
and McFall-Ngai 2011; Gilbert and Epel 2015). Building on recent philosophical work on 
symbiosis (Pradeu and Carosella 2006; Bouchard 2009; Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Pradeu 
2011; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Booth 2014b; O’Malley 2016), the contributors of this special 
issue examine symbiosis from different, yet complementary points of view. One major 
question concerns what we can call the “holobiont debate”, i.e. the question of the degree of 
unity and cohesion found in a holobiont. This question – particularly animated in some 
scientific circles (e.g., Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008; Bordenstein and Theis 2015; 
Bosch and Miller 2016; Douglas and Werren 2016; Theis et al. 2016) – is discussed in all the 
contributions of this special issue. Queller and Strassmann argue that complex holobionts are 
generally not organisms because, even when they show some cooperation, they still express 
levels of internal conflict that are too high to constitute organismic units. Skillings explores 
the holobiont debate from the point of view of the “founding” example of corals. He holds 
that most holobionts share more affinities with communities than they do with individual 
wholes, and that, in general, holobionts do not meet the criteria for being evolutionary 
individuals, units of selection, or organisms. In contrast, Gilbert and Tauber consider that 
holobionts are unified communities, acting as units from physiological, developmental, 
immunological, and evolutionary viewpoints. Pradeu defends the view that, from an 
immunological point of view, a biological individual is made of all the components that are 
immunologically tolerated, which include many (but not all) microbes found in or on a host. 
Chiu and Eberl assert that microorganisms are constitutive of host immunity as external 
scaffolds, varying in degrees of reliability, specificity, and exclusivity. In their view, even if 
holobionts are not internally integrated enough to qualify as organisms or units of selection, 
they are still individuals in a different and more general way: the holobiont must be seen as 
the host plus the microorganisms that scaffold its immunity. Haber sees holobionts as nested 
individuals, with sometimes distinct, non-overlapping life cycles. Clarke interprets holobionts 
in light of reproductive synchrony (Frank 1997) and fitness alignment (Friesen 2012) between 
the symbiotic partners.  
By offering this wide range of perspectives, we hope to offer the readers the 
opportunity to take a better-informed decision in favour of monism or pluralism. For 
pluralism-oriented people, a further choice is between a “promiscuous” pluralism (where the 
different perspectives coexist and remain largely autonomous) and a “combining” pluralism 
(where one major aim is to combine the different perspectives to produce a unified picture) 
(Guay and Pradeu 2016a). 
 In addition to examining neglected biological domains, several contributors attempt to 
clarify certain central concepts in this debate. Queller and Strassmann think that the main 
debate should be about the notion of an organism – which they define as a unit in which all 
the subunits have evolved to be highly cooperative, with very little conflict (see also Queller 
and Strassmann 2009). Clarke (2013) defends the view that the notions of organism and 
biological individual are synonymous, and in her contribution to this special issue she 
interprets evolutionary transitions as changes in the extent to which selection acts at one 
hierarchical level rather than another, a view she grounds in her definition of evolutionary 
individuality in terms of an object’s capacity to undergo selection at its own level. Pradeu 
insists, on the contrary, on the differences between the notions of organism and biological 
individual; he suggests distinguishing at least two categories of a biological individual, 
namely the physiological individual (“unit of functioning”) and the evolutionary individual 
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(“selective unit”). Godfrey-Smith also distinguishes organism from evolutionary individual. 
Complementing previous work in which he defines evolutionary individuals as Darwinian 
individuals (that is, reproducing units: Godfrey-Smith 2009; 2013), he focuses on the 
organism, which he defines as a bounded and self-maintaining unit, engaged in traffic with its 
environment (see also Arnellos and Moreno 2015). Skillings also makes a difference between 
evolutionary individuals (which he defines, following Godfrey-Smith, as Darwinian 
individuals) and organisms (which he defines as bounded individuals that are functionally or 
metabolically integrated, i.e. systems with mutually dependent components that work together 
to maintain the system’s structure or developmental trajectory). Haber offers a different 
perspective. He shows that, for the individuality thesis, individuals (be they organisms, 
species, etc.) must be understood recursively, meaning that biological individuals are 
“lineage-generating entities that are both constituted by and constitutive of other biological 
individuals”. 
 Our hope is that, in exploring new biological fields dealing with biological 
individuality, and by refining certain conceptual distinctions, this special issue will participate 
in the on-going project of building a conception of biological individuality that will be more 
unified, more inspired by historical and metaphysical considerations, and that will better 
reflect current biological perspectives and practices (Lidgard and Nyhart 2017). 
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